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Regulating Lawyers: North American
Perspectives and Problematics
IcI-ID F. DEvLIN*

In most modem societies, lawyers-both individually and as a collective
profession-are identified as playing significant social, economic, cultural,
and political roles. Lawyers are implicated in almost every aspect of our
lives: they frequently influence and draft legislation that regulates-among
various other things-the roadways and our behaviour on them, how our
houses are built and maintained, and the conditions under which we can
offer our labour; lawyers provide advice on multiple matters including family
relations, exchange relations, taxation matters, domestic trade, and
international trade; they help us establish relationships (both familial and
commercial) and help us resolve disputes when they break down; when social
relations fray, they litigate on behalf of citizens and commercial entities; they
defend or prosecute alleged criminals; they advocate for the equality of
rights for disadvantaged and minority groups; they protect us from abuses of
police power and from state interference in our private lives (and advise the
state how to successfully interfere in our private lives). In short, lawyers
exercise enormous power and influence.
Because lawyers have access to and exercise such significant power, it is
often said that they have a social contract with society. In return for the
privilege of being a lawyer, the responsibility of every lawyer, and the
profession, is to promote and protect the public interest. Others go further
and claim that because of their privileged status, lawyers and the legal
profession are fiduciaries.
The inevitable questions, of course, are as follows: how do we ensure that
lawyers fulfill their side of the bargain, and how do we guarantee that they
will faithfully and effectively live up to their fiduciary obligations? Do we
adopt a "trust us" approach, or do we establish norms, institutions, and
procedures to frame and, where necessary, enforce lawyers' obligations?
* Richard Devlin FRSC is a Professor and the Associate Dean Research at the Schulich
School of Law, Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, Canada. Most recently he has been a coeditor of three books Regulating 7udges: Beyond Independence and Accountability (2016), Lawyers'

Ethics And Professional Regulation 3d (2017), and Canada and the Rule of Law: 150 Years After
Confederation (2017).
1. This mini symposium grows out of a panel discussion sponsored by the North American
Consortium on Legal Education in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2015. The papers are
dedicated to the memory of Steve Zamora, the "founding father" of the North American
Consortium of Legal Education, and a lifelong champion for the cause of greater North

American co-operation and collaboration.
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The core concern is not so much that lawyers are bad (although there are, of
course, bad lawyers in multiple senses); rather it is that there are structures,
incentives, and temptations that might distract lawyers from their
contractual obligations with, and fiduciary obligations to, society and the
public interest. On one level, there is the materialist concern that both
individual lawyers and the legal profession generally will put their economic
interests ahead of either their clients' interests or society's interests. On
another level, there is the social capital concern that like many professions
lawyers will give priority to matters that advance or protect their privileged
social status. Third, there is the ideological concern that lawyers will
articulate, advance, and even enforce their particular worldviews, which may
not be generally representative of society.
One potentially fruitful approach to addressing these problematicsindeed these conundrums-is to turn towards the contemporary regulation
theory.

I.

Contemporary Regulation Theory and Practice2

In the last three decades, there has been an explosion of theoretical
analyses and empirical research on regulation. This work has been driven by
the insights and interactions of multiple disciplines including (but not
limited to) economics, sociology, psychology, political science, law, public
policy, anthropology, criminology, political economy, philosophy, history,
mathematics, and international relations.3 There have been regulatory
investigations of almost every realm of human interaction: political,
economic, social, cultural, bureaucratic, 'public', and 'private'.4 Regulatory
research has been focused on micro,s meso, 6 and macro-level7 relationships
and has targeted local,8 national,9 and international dynamics.o
2. For a fuller exploration of the relevance of regulation theory to the legal professions, see
Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek, eds., Regulating Judges: Beyond Independence and Accountability
(Edward Elgar, 2017).
3. John Braithwaite et al., Can Regulation and Governance Make a Digference, 1 REGULATION
AND GOVERNANCE 1 (2007) [hereinafter Regulation and Governance]; Robert Baldwin et al. eds.,
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (2010) [hereinafter OxFORD HANDBOOK].
4. See generally REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 3.
5. See generally Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts (2002).
6. Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing EnvironmentalPolicy 6-7
(1998).
7. See generally Mark Findley & Wei Lim, Regulatory Worlds: Culturaland Social Perspectives
When North Meets South (2014).
8. See generally Christopher Hood & Martin Lodge, Pavlovian Innovation, Pet Solutions and
Economizing on Rationality: Politiciansand DangerousDogs in Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative
Analysis (Julia Black et al. eds., 2005).
9. See, e.g., Jacinth Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., The Politicsof Regulation: Institutions and
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Government (2005) [hereinafter The Politics of Regulation]; G.B.
Doern et al., Rules and Unruliness.
10. See generally John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000).
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Because of this diversity and richness, it is not possible to provide a
definition of regulation that would command the agreement of all its
interlocutors. In this sense, regulation is an 'essentially contested' concept"
and practice. But for the purposes of this Symposium, we adopt a working
definition and suggest that there are four key themes that are particularly
significant. By way of a working definition, Black et al. have suggested that:
Regulation is a dynamic exercise in collective problem-solving .

.

. the

sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according
to standards or goals with the intention of producing a broadly defined
outcome or outcomes which may. involve mechanisms of standard
setting, information-gathering and behaviour modification.12
Building upon this skeleton, a review of the literature suggests a few key
themes.
Regulation is an inherently normative and programmaticexercise. While there
are undoubtedly difficult technical and practical aspects to every regulatory
initiative, in the end, all regulation is driven by a desire to improve the
public good.o Inevitably, there are different-even competingconceptions of what is meant by 'the public good,' but there can be no
avoiding the normativity of any regulatory enterprise.14 Importantly, even if
there is no dispute as to the ideal values, there is usually more than one value
at stake in the pursuit of the public good and these various values may be in
tension or even in conflict. Regulatory interventions need to be aware of,
and responsive to, these normative challenges and dilemmas.
Regulation is complex. Once upon a time, 'regulation' was conceived of as
an essentially prescriptive, pseudo-Austinian, phenomenon: it was the
command and control model whereby one party would mandate rules and
enforce compliance through sanctions.15 Regulation in this model was
hierarchical, monological, deterrent-driven, and 'hard.' Contemporary
conceptions of regulation acknowledge that command and control
prescriptions are one form of regulation, but argue that, descriptively and
normatively, regulation is more encompassing. Because command and
control approaches have their weaknesses and limitations-ineffectiveness,
expensiveness, bluntness, and inflexibility-the realm of regulation has been
expanded to identify and endorse other forms of regulation that are more
collaborative, more persuasive, more co-operative, more accommodative,
more dialogical, and 'soft.' These have been variously described as
11. W.B. Gallie, Esentially Contested Concepts 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
167 (1956).
12. Julia Black et al. eds., Regulatory Innovation: A ComparativeAnalysis 11 (2005).
13. OxFoRD HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 563; see generally The PoliticsofRegulation, supra note
9.
14. Regulation and Governance, supra note 3, at 1; Christine Parker, Twenty Years of Responsive
Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal, 7 REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 2 (2013).
15. See generally OxFoRD HANDBOOK, supra note 3.
SOCIETY
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'responsive,'6 'smart,'7 'meta,'s 'really responsive,'19 'risk-based,'20
'principles-based,'21 or 'outcomes-focused.'22 Such approaches, in turn,
generate an additional set of inquiries into the meaning, nature, and
dynamics of (non)compliance.23
Regulatory analysis is highly contextual. Because the realms of social
interaction are so diverse, and because the regulatory objectives, goals, and
values can be so distinct, it is neither possible nor desirable to seek
universalizability of regulatory analyses.24 Rather, it is preferable to identify
a particular realm of inquiry, articulate appropriate guiding values, and then
interrogate and assess whether those values are being achieved through the
prevailing structures, institutions, processes, actors, and dynamics.25 Such
contextualism requires us to pay attention not only to what regulators try to
do, but also how the regulatees respond.26 Viewed in this light, regulation is
a craft, a problem-solving art.2 7
Change, Flux, and Innovation. Many analysts of regulation argue that
because of the inevitability (and rapidity) of social, economic, political,
cultural, and technological changes, regulatory norms, processes, and
instruments must also be dynamic.28 Regulation is, therefore, always a work
in progress. 29 To be effective, regulatory thinking cannot be frozen in time,
and regulators must be open to innovation, revision, recalibration,
reconstruction, and experimentation. Reflexivity and imagination are core
capabilities for both regulatory actors and institutions.30
It is important to emphasize, however, that regulatory imagination and
innovation are not to be understood as ends in themselves. Rather, any
16. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcendingthe DeregulationDebate 4
(1992).
17. Gunningharn et al., supra note 6, at 1.
18. See generally Christine Parker, The Open Corporation:Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy
(2002).
19. Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MODERN L. Rnv. 59 (2008).
20. Bridget Hutter, The Attractions of Risk-Based Regulation:Accounting for the Emergence of Risk
Ideas in Regulation (2005).
21. Christie Ford, Principles-BasedSecurities Regulation in the Wake of the GlobalFinancialCrisis,
55 McGiLL L. REV. 257 (2010).
22. See generally Andrew Hopper & Gregory Treverton-Jones, Outcomes-Focused Regulation: A
PracticalGuide (2011).
23. See generally Christine Parker & Viebieke Nielsen, Explaining Compliance: Business Responses
to Regulation (2011).
24. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 16, at 110; Robert Baldwin et al., UnderstandingRegulation:
Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd ed. 2011) [hereinafter UnderstandingRegulation].
25. See generally The Politics of Regulation, supra note 9.
26. Parker & Nielsen eds. supra note 23.
27. See generally Malcolm Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: ControllingRisks, Solving Problemsand
Managing Compliance (2000).
28. See, e.g., Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 16; The Politics of Regulation, supra note 9;
UnderstandingRegulation, supra note 24.
29. Julia Black, Learningfrom Regulatory Disasters, 10(3) POLICY QUARTERLY 3 (2014).
30. Black, supra note 12, at 11.

2017]

REGULATING LAWYERS

405

assessment of such changes must be directly related to the norms and values
initially identified and the outcomes desired. This is simply a re-iteration of
my initial observation that regulation always has an irrepressible normative
underbelly.

II. Applying Regulatory Theory to the North American Legal
Professions
In this mini symposium, which grows out of a North American
Consortium on Legal Education (NACLE) workshop in Monterrey, Mexico
in 2015, three scholars from Canada, Mexico, and the United States apply
some of the insights of regulation theory to the legal professions in each of
these jurisdictions. A comprehensive analysis of the regulation of the legal
professions in each jurisdiction would, of course, require a significant
volume. Therefore, to make the project manageable, we have identified
three key dimensions that are particularly challenging at the current
moment: legal education, lawyer regulation, and transnational lawyering.
We have chosen legal education because control over who gets permission to
enter the profession (and by what criteria such decisions are made) has
determinative impact on the delivery of legal services in each jurisdiction.
Second, we have chosen lawyer regulation because, in the last decade, there
have been several significant controversies in each of the jurisdictions on
who, or what, should be regulated, and by whom? Third, we have chosen
transnational lawyering because the combination of globalization (and the
desire for greater North American integration) and technological innovation
suggests to us that the historic national boundaries that have traditionally
structured the regulation of lawyers are eroding, with the result that this is
an immediate and pressing challenge that cannot be ignored. Each of the
essays presents a careful and insightful analysis of some of the most currently
significant regulatory challenges in each of the three jurisdictions, and each
can be read on its own. But collectively, they also illustrate the four key
regulatory themes discussed above.
Regulation is an inherently normative and programmatic exercise. All three
contributors clearly illustrate the normative and programmatic nature of
regulation. For Professor Lutz, the goal of regulating "inbound
transnational lawyers" to the U.S. is to ensure competency and competition,
while the goal of "regulating outbound transnational lawyers" is to facilitate
trade in legal services and building the rule of law in the world. For
Professor Urquiaga, the normative agenda for the regulation of Mexican
lawyers must be to ensure the provision of competent, accessible, and
professionally responsible legal services. For Professor Roussy, the currently
dominant normative imperative is to provide uniform quality in legal
education and the ethics standards of the Canadian legal profession.
Regulation is complex. While the circumstances of the United States,
Mexico, and Canada are different, each of the authors agrees that the
regulation of the legal profession is a highly complex exercise. In Mexico,
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the sheer numbers of law schools, legal associations, and lawyers makes
coherent and cohesive regulation an enormous challenge. In the United
States, regulation is plagued by the tension between the forces of globalized
openness on the one hand, and localized protectionism on the other. In
Canada, the federal nature of its legal professional framework has created
historic barriers to national mobility and uniformity, and has required the
Federation of Law Societies of Canada to engage in a slow and patient (but
very determined) reconstruction of the regulatory regime.
Regulatory analysis is highly contextual. The essays also reveal the highly
contextual nature of lawyer regulation. The economic, political, social, and
cultural traditions of Canada, the United States, and Mexico are radically
different, and this has a manifest impact on the prevailing regulatory
challenges in each jurisdiction. Mexico seems to be struggling to establish
some of the rudimentary elements of an effective and efficient regulatory
regime for its legal profession. Canada is maneuvering to move beyond its
checkerboard historical regulatory practices to constitute a more uniformand hopefully fair-governance system. The United States is exploring and
experimenting with a variety of mechanisms to ensure that it remains a
central player in the increasing globalization of legal practice.
Change, Flux, and Innovation. All three contributors demonstrate that
change and flux are unavoidable realities of the contemporary legal services
market place. They all agree that the dynamics of globalization and the
emergence of new technologies will inevitably have an impact on the
regulation of the legal professions. Furthermore, they also agree that access
to justice-to the extent that it dovetails with access to legal services-is an
increasing challenge in every jurisdiction, and that the regulators of the legal
professions need to respond to this fundamental challenge to the legitimacy
and integrity of their legal professions. But the three jurisdictions seem to
vary in their willingness to engage in innovation. While none are
particularly radical (compared, for example, to what is happening in
Australia or the United Kingdom), the United States seeks to re-orient legal
education and become more responsive to transnational lawyering. In
Canada, the major innovation is the centralization of power and authority in
one national umbrella organization with the express desire to get things
done. In Mexico, despite attempts at significant regulatory reform to
improve the governance structures of the profession, there has been tough
(and seemingly effective) resistance.
III.

Conclusion

Professors Urquiaga, Roussy, and Lutz have identified significantly
different contemporary challenges for the regulation of the legal professions
in Mexico, Canada, and the United States. On the one hand, this indicates
that it would be unwise, or at least premature, to espouse the idea (or ideal)
of a North American legal profession. But at the same time, the essays
illustrate that there is increasing awareness of the global and regional forces
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that are having an impact on the obligations of the regulators of the legal
professions. While the problematics and perspectives (and even the
aspirations) in Canada, Mexico, and the United States might be different,
there is consensus that the regulation of the legal professions is a work in
progress and that, if anything, the challenges may be getting even more
difficult.

